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PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_______________ 
 
No. 18-2303 
_______________ 
 
JAMES RANDALL, 
   Appellant 
 
v. 
 
CITY OF PHILADELPHIA LAW DEPARTMENT; 
JOHN MOUZON, Philadelphia Police Officer Badge 
#5293; 
LEON MCKNIGHT, Philadelphia Police Officer Badge 
#6630 
_______________ 
 
On Petition from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. No: 2:18-cv-01541) 
District Judge: Honorable Wendy Beetlestone 
_______________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
on January 25, 2019 
 
Before: SMITH, Chief Judge, and CHAGARES and  
BIBAS, Circuit Judges 
 
(Filed: March 20, 2019) 
_______________ 
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Michael I. McDermott, Esq. 
18th Floor 
121 South Broad Street 
Philadelphia, PA 19107 
Counsel for Appellant 
 
Jennifer MacNaughton, Esq. 
Andrew Pomager, Esq. 
City of Philadelphia 
Law Department 
1515 Arch Street 
Philadelphia, PA 19102 
 Counsel for Appellees 
_______________ 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
______________ 
 
BIBAS, Circuit Judge. 
When a defendant commits a continuing violation of the 
law, the limitations period starts running from the defendant’s 
last act, not from when the effects of that violation end. Here, 
the defendants arrested and prosecuted James Randall in Phil-
adelphia for drug and weapons crimes. As a result of that pros-
ecution, New Jersey and Delaware County, Pennsylvania, 
lodged detainers against Randall for violating his probation. So 
he remained in those jurisdictions’ custody until December 
2015. But the defendants’ last act was in August 2015, when 
they dropped the charges and sent Randall to New Jersey. 
So the clock started to run on Randall’s Section 1983 mali-
cious-prosecution claim in August 2015. And that clock ran out 
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in August 2017. But Randall filed this suit in December 
2017—four months too late. So we will affirm the District 
Court’s dismissal of this suit as untimely. 
I. BACKGROUND 
In December 2013, Philadelphia police found drugs, a gun, 
and money in an apartment that they thought was Randall’s. So 
the police arrested Randall, and the Philadelphia District At-
torney’s Office charged him with drug and weapons crimes. 
But it dropped all the charges on August 24, 2015. 
This was not the end of Randall’s time in custody. When he 
was arrested in Philadelphia, he was already on probation in 
both New Jersey and Delaware County, Pennsylvania. And 
when they heard about his arrest, both those jurisdictions is-
sued detainers for him. So after dropping the charges, Pennsyl-
vania released Randall into New Jersey’s custody. He re-
mained in custody, first in New Jersey and then in Delaware 
County, until December 24, 2015.  
On December 26, 2017, Randall sued the Philadelphia Law 
Department and the Philadelphia police officers who had ar-
rested him. His amended complaint alleged several Section 
1983 claims and Pennsylvania tort claims. The defendants 
moved to dismiss based on the statute of limitations. The Dis-
trict Court granted the motion, dismissing Randall’s claims 
with prejudice as time-barred.  
Randall appeals only the dismissal of his Section 1983 ma-
licious-prosecution claim. We review that dismissal de novo. 
Conrad v. Pa. State Police, 902 F.3d 178, 182 (3d Cir. 2018). 
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II. RANDALL’S SUIT WAS UNTIMELY 
Randall claims that his suit was timely because the contin-
uing-violation doctrine delayed the start of the limitations pe-
riod until his ultimate release. We disagree. 
Section 1983 has no statute of limitations of its own. See 42 
U.S.C. § 1983. Rather, it borrows the underlying state’s statute 
of limitations for personal-injury torts. Wallace v. Kato, 549 
U.S. 384, 387 (2007). In Pennsylvania, that period is two years. 
42 Pa. Stat. and Cons. Stat. Ann. § 5524(1), (7) (2014). 
But when a Section 1983 claim accrues is a matter of fed-
eral law. Wallace, 549 U.S. at 388. And federal law holds that 
a malicious-prosecution claim accrues when criminal proceed-
ings end in the plaintiff’s favor. Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 
477, 489 (1994). For Randall, that happened in August 2015, 
when Pennsylvania dropped the charges against him. So he had 
until August 2017 to file his suit unless something delayed or 
tolled the statute of limitations. 
Randall claims that the continuing-violation doctrine post-
poned the running of the statute of limitations. This doctrine 
applies “when a defendant’s conduct is part of a continuing 
practice.” Brenner v. Local 514, United Bhd. of Carpenters & 
Joiners of Am., 927 F.2d 1283, 1295 (3d Cir. 1991). In such 
cases, “so long as the last act [in] the continuing practice falls 
within the limitations period . . . the court will grant relief for 
the earlier related acts that would otherwise be time barred.” 
Cowell v. Palmer Twp., 263 F.3d 286, 292 (3d Cir. 2001). 
Here, even after Pennsylvania dropped the charges against 
Randall, he remained detained. He argues that this detention 
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was part of a continuing practice by the defendants. So, he says, 
his limitations period did not begin to run until his release on 
December 24, 2015. If that is right, then his suit was timely. 
Under the Federal Rules, he filed on the last possible day: De-
cember 24, 2017, was a Sunday; December 25 was a legal hol-
iday; and he sued on December 26. Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a)(1)(C). 
But the continuing-violation doctrine focuses on continuing 
acts, not effects. Cowell, 263 F.3d at 293. In other words, the 
doctrine relies on a defendant’s continuing acts, not a plain-
tiff’s continuing injury. Here, New Jersey and Delaware 
County detained Randall past August 2015. But New Jersey 
and Delaware County are not defendants. No defendant de-
tained Randall beyond August 2015. 
Nor does it matter that Randall’s arrest and prosecution 
were but-for causes of his continued detention in New Jersey 
and Delaware County. Continued detention was an effect of his 
Philadelphia arrest and prosecution, not an act (or omission in 
the face of a duty to act) by any defendant. And he has not 
alleged that the defendants somehow enrolled New Jersey or 
Delaware County as their agents in detaining him. So that de-
tention did not trigger the continuing-violation doctrine. 
To be clear, our holding is about the timeliness of Randall’s 
case, not its merits. For the continuing-violation doctrine is a 
timeliness rule, not a merits rule. His continued detention could 
be relevant to liability or damages; we need not decide that. 
But it has no bearing on his suit’s timeliness. 
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* * * * * 
Randall’s malicious-prosecution claim accrued in August 
2015, when Pennsylvania dropped the charges against him. 
The defendants did nothing after that date that could delay the 
start of the limitations period. So the limitations period expired 
in August 2017. Randall filed his suit after that. Because his 
suit was untimely, we will affirm. 
